University of the District of Columbia School of Law

Digital Commons @ UDC Law
Journal Articles

Publications

2015

Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look
at the Nation's First Criminal Domestic Violence Court
Mae C. Quinn
University of the District of Columbia David A Clarke School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/fac_journal_articles
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look at the Nation's First
Criminal Domestic Violence Court, 41 (macro my.short_title 733 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/fac_journal_articles/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Digital Commons @ UDC Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UDC Law. For
more information, please contact lawlibraryhelp@udc.edu.

The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

June 2015

Anna Moscowitz Kross and The Home Term Part:
A Second Look at the Nation's First Criminal
Domestic Violence Court
Mae C. Quinn

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Quinn, Mae C. (2008) "Anna Moscowitz Kross and The Home Term Part: A Second Look at the Nation's First
Criminal Domestic Violence Court," Akron Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Quinn: A Second Look at the Nation's First Domestic Violence Court
QUINN_FINAL

3/23/2009 3:03 PM

ANNA MOSCOWITZ KROSS AND THE HOME TERM
PART: A SECOND LOOK AT THE NATION’S FIRST
CRIMINAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT
Mae C. Quinn ∗

I.
II.
III.
IV.

Introduction ....................................................................... 733
Kross’s Early Women’s Rights Work ............................... 737
Kross’s Court Reform and Judicial Innovation Efforts ..... 739
Kross’s Home Term Part: The Nation’s First Criminal
Domestic Violence Court .................................................. 742
Looking Back at Home Term as We Look Ahead: The
Future of Domestic Violence Prosecutions ....................... 757

V.

“It all started as an experiment in 1946, when the volume of family
disputes for the entire city was handled . . . in the District [M]agistrates
courts in the usual run-of-the-mill fashion. What we sought was to
remove the rigid formalism of court room atmosphere and procedure
and to individualize, in so far as possible, the cases that were brought
before us. . . . to mend broken lives.” 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Many proclaim that criminal domestic violence courts −
∗Copyright © 2007, 2008 Mae C. Quinn. Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law. This paper is dedicated to Dr. Helen K. Golden, daughter of Anna Moscowitz
Kross, who has kindly supported and encouraged my research and writing about her mother. Words
cannot express my gratitude for her warmth and generosity in welcoming me into her life and into
the life of her family. Many thanks also to Professor Tracy Thomas, Associate Dean Elizabeth
Reilly, and the University of Akron School of Law for sponsoring the New Face of Women’s Legal
History Conference in October 2007, at which I delivered remarks relating to this article, and to
Rosemary Burr, Mary Pat Byrn, Jennifer Hendricks, Amy Hess, and William Montross for their
comments on an earlier draft. My continuing gratitude to the American Jewish Archives at Hebrew
Union College, which maintains Kross’s papers.
1. Anna M. Kross, A Love Seat in Court, LOOK MAG., March 1, 1950, at 2 (on file with
author).
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specialized court parts that focus on intimate violence cases and utilize a
particularized approach in such prosecutions to prevent further violence
− are a recent innovation within our criminal justice system. Most
observers point to the Quincy District Court in Massachusetts, which
opened in 1987, as the first venue in this country to offer specialized
processing of criminal domestic abuse prosecutions. 2 In the two decades
since the Quincy court opened its doors, other jurisdictions have
developed similar models using similar specialized approaches. 3
A growing body of literature lauds the “innovative,” coordinated
approaches employed by these courts, including no-drop prosecution
policies to protect complaining witnesses and court-ordered batterer
intervention programs for those accused of violence. 4 These practices
2. ROBERT V. WOLF, CALIFORNIA’S COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING A
PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUDICIARY
15
(2005),
available
at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/CA%20Story_1.pdf (“The first domestic
violence court was launched in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1987.”); GREG BERMAN & JOHN
FEINBLATT, JUDGES AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 8 (2002), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/JudgesProblemSolvingCourts1.pdf (“The first
domestic violence court was launched in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1987.”); see also Elena
Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U.L. REV. 329 (1994); Jennifer Thompson,
Note, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing A Traditional Paradigm in the Context
of Specialized Domestic Violence Programs, 56 MAINE L. REV. 407, 415-420 (2004) (offering a
history of domestic violence policies and indicating that until the 1970s and 1980s intimate violence
was not prosecuted criminally but was seen as a private matter between family members).
3. See generally RONALD SHELTON, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
IN
THE
UNITED STATES 2007, available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/famct&CISOPTR=173 (cataloguing the emergence and spread of
domestic violence courts throughout the United States over the last two decades and describing this
as a recent phenomenon); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1298-1309 (2000)
(discussing the rise in popularity of domestic violence courts following the creation of the Quincy
Court); see also Laylan Copelin, New Court Dedicated to Family Violence, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Jan. 4, 1999, at B1 (describing Austin, Texas’s first criminal domestic violence court);
Domestic Violence Court A Solid Recommendation, THE JACKSON SUN, Nov. 13, 2007 (calling for
the creation of a domestic violence court in Jackson, Tennessee). Judge Shelton suggests that
modern “feminization” of the bench may have paved the way to acceptance of specialized domestic
violence courts. SHELTON, supra, at 8. Cf. Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s
Critique of the New York City Women’s Court: The Problem of Solving the “Problem” of
Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 665, 681-82 n.86 (2006)
[hereinafter Quinn, Revisiting] (discussing “feminization” of the bench in the 1930s in conjunction
with the Women’s Court movement).
4. See generally SHELTON, supra note 3, at 8-10; ROBERT V. WOLF, LIBERTY ALDRICH &
SAMANTHA MOORE, PLANNING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: THE NEW YORK STATE
EXPERIENCE 18 (2004), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/dvplanningdiary.pdf; Robin Mazur & Liberty
Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence Court Work? Lessons from New York, 42 JUDGES’ J. 5, 6
(2003), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=1737 (“Domestic violence court is designed to
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and policies grow from the assumption that domestic violence crimes are
different from others, presenting a particular dynamic between abuser
and victim that requires a unique kind of case processing. 5 Accused
abusers present a future danger and are in need of punishment and
monitoring; alleged victims are vulnerable and in need of ongoing
protection from defendant abuse and control. 6
Court planners in New York assert that its first criminal domestic
violence court was established in 1996. 7 Located in Brooklyn, that
institution has been described as a leader in the domestic violence court
movement for its consistent use of these innovative approaches and its
development of a “dedicated court team.” 8 The team, including “judge,
attorneys, victim advocates and a resource coordinator—ensures that
address traditional problems of domestic violence, such as low reports, withdrawn charges, threats
to victim, lack of defendant accountability, and high recidivism, by intense judicial scrutiny of the
defendant and close cooperation between the judiciary and social services.”); Municipal Court of
Seattle webpage, available at http://www.seattle.gov/courts/prob/dvprob.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2008) (describing the domestic violence court’s policies, including that “[i]n many cases, the City
will prosecute a case even if the victim refuses to testify”).
5. SHELTON, supra note 3, at 5-11 (describing the evolution of current domestic violence
policies based upon an evolving understanding of violence between intimates); WOLF, ALDRICH &
MOORE, supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing underlying assumptions between defendants and
complaining witnesses in domestic abuse cases). According to New York State Chief Judge Judith
Kaye, “[b]ecause of their intimate bond with the victim, perpetrators of domestic violence present a
particularly high risk of continuing, even escalating the violence against the complainant as they
seek further control over her choices and actions.” Id. at 4. See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, DO BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS WORK? TWO STUDIES 2 (2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/200331.pdf (discussing the use by victims’ advocates of the
“power and control wheel” theory to understand family violence, which assumes that the accused
wants to control his partner’s behaviors and that “changing this dynamic is key to changing their
behavior”).
6. SHELTON, supra note 3, at 8-10 (“Domestic violence courts . . . focus primarily on the
victim rather than the offender. The initial focus is on the safety of the battered women and any
children that are involved. The court also focuses on the accountability of the offender for his own
misconduct rather than exploring the etiology of that conduct.”); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps,
Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Call for a Problem-Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999-2000) (calling for reforms in processing of criminal domestic violence matters
to take account of the “special characteristics” of such cases including complainants who have
safety concerns and defendants who need close judicial monitoring even before a finding of guilt);
see also Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes: Effectively Using Rule
404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 361, 364 (1998)
(indicating that all men who abuse do so as a means of controlling their victims and that such
conduct is a learned behavior, not a feature of any illness).
7. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 6 (“The first domestic violence court in the state
opened in Brooklyn in 1996 . . . .”); WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra note 4 (chronicling the
creation of domestic violence courts in New York, starting with the “inception” of the first such
court in 1996).
8. WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra note 4, at 5 (“‘[D]efendant accountability and victim
safety’ has become the mantra of New York’s domestic violence courts . . . .”).
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defendants are carefully monitored, victims have access to
comprehensive services and the judges have the information they need to
make quick and effective decisions.” 9
These contemporary accounts of judicial innovation fail to
acknowledge, however, that a somewhat similar experiment in specially
adjudicating domestic violence prosecutions was undertaken more than
fifty years ago in New York. In 1946, Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross
established New York State’s first criminal domestic violence court
within New York City’s Magistrates’ Court system. 10 The Home Term
Part, as Kross’s court was called, was a groundbreaking experiment in
criminal justice that sought to employ a particularized approach in
domestic violence cases to address charges of assault, harassment,
disorderly conduct and other abuses. Nevertheless, Kross, one of New
York’s first women judges, and her early attempts at judicial innovation
like the Home Term Part, have been largely forgotten by legal historians
and court reformers alike. 11
This paper seeks to inform current conversations about dedicated
domestic violence courts by shedding light on Kross’s remarkable early
efforts to treat domestic violence prosecutions differently from other
criminal matters and handle them in a designated court part. The story
of Kross’s Home Term Part – the first specialized criminal domestic
violence court in New York and perhaps the United States—is an
important chapter in the history of intimate violence policies in this
country. Recognition of Home Term is crucial to any complete account
and understanding of our criminal justice system’s renewed efforts at
judicial innovation through specialized “problem-solving” courts. And
although many practices of Home Term would be viewed as
objectionable by modern standards, examining Home Term may also

9. See The Center for Court Innovation – Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court webpage,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PageID=599 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007); see also Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 7-8; WOLF, ALDRICH & MOORE, supra
note 4.
10. Shirley F. Mehl, Judge Anna Kross and the Home Term Court, 36 WOMEN LAW. J. 7
(1950).
11. This paper is the second in a series of works that seek to fill this void and shed greater
light on Kross’s remarkable life and career. See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3; see also Mae C.
Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Original Problem-Solving Court: Lessons to Learn from a
Lifetime of Judicial Innovation (in progress; on file with author); Mae C. Quinn, Lady Vols Call the
Shots in Full-Court Press: Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross and Her All-Woman Auxiliary of Criminal
Court Case Workers (in progress; on file with author) [hereinafter Quinn, Lady Vols]; MAE C.
QUINN, ANNA MOSCOWITZ KROSS: A BIOGRAPHY (in progress; on file with author).
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provide important insights for contemporary court reformers as they
consider the future of domestic violence prosecutions.
II. KROSS’S EARLY WOMEN’S RIGHTS WORK
Anna Moscowitz Kross, a poor Russian immigrant who grew up in
tenement apartments in Manhattan’s Lower East Side, was among the
first women graduates of New York University Law School, receiving
her first law degree in 1910. 12 Even as a youth, Kross was concerned
with women’s rights issues and the interests of the disempowered. 13
Perhaps her earliest and best known advocacy work involved her
campaign against the Women’s Court, a specialized part of the
Magistrates’ Court system 14 that handled prostitution cases and had
become known over the years for ineffectiveness, injustice, and
corruption. 15
As a law student, Kross and others monitored the court’s practices,
which included inviting spectators to attend the female-only evening
sessions to observe defendants as they were paraded before the court. 16
As a young lawyer she encouraged volunteer lawyers to join her in
providing representation for alleged sex workers, some falsely accused
by vice officers, who could not otherwise afford counsel. 17 She went on
to become Chair of the Legal Committee of the Forum of the Church of
the Ascension, an organization that offered free legal counsel to women
in the Night Court. 18 In 1915, Kross, only in her mid-twenties, was

12. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 669-70; see also Salute to Judge Kross, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1950, at 26 (describing Kross’s upbringing in the tenements of New York); Embattled City
Aide: Anna Moscowitz Kross, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1958, at 16 (recounting that as a law student
Kross spent much of her time advocating women’s suffrage and assisting women in the Women’s
Night Court).
13. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 670; see also Leah N. Neurer, New York Woman Judge
Attained High Goal Through Sacrifice, Struggle and Determination, 25 WOMEN LAW. J. 52, 52
(1938-39) (lauding Kross’s work as a teenager teaching immigrants to read English).
14. The Magistrates’ Court system was a police court in New York City that handled a variety
of matters, including adjudication of low-level criminal charges. See Anna M. Kross & Harold M.
Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York: History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L.
REV. 133, 133 (1937-38).
15. See generally Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3.
16. Actively involved with various New York City women’s groups, Kross assisted with their
court monitoring work and also worked with the Prison Committee of the Church of the Ascension
to provide reentry services for discharged women prisoners. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at
677-81; see also Embattled City Aide: Anna Moscowitz Kross, supra note 12, at 16.
17. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3 at 678-80.
18. Id. at 679-80; see also Martin Panzer, A Real American and A Real Jewess: The Story of
Magistrate Anna Moscowitz Kross Who Is Being Boomed for the State Supreme Court, THE AM.
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named as one of only a few “New York City women who . . . made a
success at their chosen profession” of law. 19
In the years that followed, Kross became increasingly involved in
public and political life, in part through her participation in Democratic
Party women’s groups. 20 She also became more vocal in her criticism of
the Women’s Court, which she believed entrapped many innocent
women, unfairly punished conduct that was really a social problem, and
failed to meaningfully address the issues that contributed to
prostitution. 21 The criminal court system, she believed, was too
narrowly focused on the law and not sufficiently interested in social
science or discovering the causes of problems presented. 22
In 1918, Kross, taken on as a political “protégé” of Democratic
Governor Alfred E. Smith, 23 was appointed as the City’s first woman
Assistant Corporation Counsel. 24 In the Corporation Counsel’s office
Kross handled family law matters on behalf of the City and conducted a
study of the courts’ handling of domestic violence matters in New
York. 25
Around the same time, Kross’s former law school colleague and
fellow Women’s Court volunteer lawyer, Jean Norris, was appointed to
the Magistrates’ Court bench. 26 The first woman to hold that post,

HEBREW, Sept. 30, 1938, at 6; Howard Whitman, Annie, The Poor Man’s Judge, COLLIERS, Mar. 1,
1947; see also JOHN M. MURTAGH & SARA HARRIS, CAST THE FIRST STONE 224 (1957).
19. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679; see also Jean H. Norris, The Women Lawyers’
Association, 4 WOMEN’S LAW. J. 28, 28 (1915).
20. See New Plea for Steilow: Appelbaum Tells Humanitarian Cult of Commutation Request,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1916, at 22 (indicating that Kross was Chairperson of both the Legal
Committee of the Church of the Ascension and the New York City Federation of Women’s Clubs);
School for Women Voters to Open, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1923, at XX2 (discussing Kross’s
involvement in the Women’s Democratic Club).
21. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679-80; see also, e.g., Anna Moscowitz, The Night
Court for Women in New York City, 5 WOMEN LAWYERS’ J. 9 (1915); John M. Murtagh, Problems
and Treatment of Prostitution, 23 CORRECTION 3, 3 (1958) (discussing Kross’s public letter to
Mayor John Purroy Mitchel criticizing the Women’s Court).
22. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 679-80; see also Moscowitz, supra note 21, at 9.
23. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682, n.88 and accompanying text; see also Panzer,
supra note 18, at 10; Democratic Women Win Two Places on the Party “Big Four,” N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1920, at 1 (discussing Kross’s involvement in the Democratic Party and ties to Governor
Smith). Smith was first elected governor in 1918 and reelected to three additional terms. See
generally CHRISTOPHER FINAN, ALFRED E. SMITH: THE HAPPY WARRIOR (2002).
24. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682; see also Kross Biography of Dec. 1964, 5-8 (on
file with New York Corrections History Society).
25. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 682, n.90; see also Kross Biography, supra note 24.
26. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 681; Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench: First
Woman Magistrate to be Named in This State Nominated by Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1919, at 4
[hereinafter Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench; see also Ida White Parker, Justice is Truth in
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Norris was assigned to the Women’s Court. 27 Her tenure was cut short,
however, by her apparent involvement in the very improprieties and
corruption she and Kross had fought so hard to prevent years earlier. 28
Following a scandalous, high profile investigation, in 1931 she was
removed from the bench. 29
After much discussion about who should replace Norris, on his last
day in office Mayor John P. O’Brien appointed Kross as the second
woman to serve in New York City’s Magistrates’ Court. 30 Sworn in on
January 1, 1934 along with the City’s new mayor and another of her law
school classmates, Fiorello LaGuardia, 31 Kross thus began the next
important phase of her career—judicial innovation.
III. KROSS’S COURT REFORM AND JUDICIAL INNOVATION EFFORTS
From the beginning of her tenure Kross sought to revamp the
Magistrates’ court system, which she continued to believe was illequipped to deal with social problems presented in the form of criminal

Action, THE BUS. WOMAN 8-9, 76 (1923) (describing Norris as a “woman who has climbed
successfully to the top in the legal profession”).
27. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 681; Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench, supra
note 26, at 4; see also Parker, supra note 26, at 8-9.
28. Quinn, Revisited, supra note 3, at 678-79, n.62, 684, n.103.
29. Norris was removed in 1931 because of her alleged misconduct in handling prostitution
cases in the Women’s Court. Mrs. Norris Fights to Appeal Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1931, at
2 (reporting that Norris was removed from the bench on June 25, 1931). She, along with other
judges, lawyers, and bondsmen, was accused of various improprieties including delivering
unfounded convictions and accepting bribes. SAMUEL SEABURY, IN THE MATTER OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND THE
MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURT (1932)
(Seabury authored a two hundred and fifty-six page report outlining the various facets of his
investigation of the Magistrates’ Courts and the evidence uncovered, including improprieties on the
part of Norris).
30. Whitman, supra note 18, at 46, 49; see also O’Brien Gives Jobs to 3 on Last Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1933, at 8 (noting that Kross, who was chair of O’Brien’s women’s campaign
committee during the last election, was a surprise appointment over a Tammany Hall favorite and
LaGuardia supporter); New Magistrates Assigned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1934, at 2 (noting that
Mayor O’Brien appointed Kross to the Magistrates’ Court shortly before he left office).
31. Moscowitz and LaGuardia received Bachelor of Laws degrees from New York University
Law School in 1910. See New York University, Seventy-Eighth Commencement Program, June 8,
1910, at 11 (on file with N.Y.U. Archives); see also Women’s Bar Backs Mrs. Kross For State
Supreme Court, TELEGRAM, Sept. 14, 1938 (“Kross recalls that [LaGuardia] was one of the few
male students sympathetic to the idea of women’s suffrage; that he joined a women’s suffrage
collegiate chapter which she formed with the late Inez Milholland.”). Kross received her L.L.M. the
following year. See New York University, Seventy-Ninth Commencement Program, June 7, 1911,
at 10 (on file with N.Y.U. Archives).
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allegations. 32 One of her first actions was to call for closure of the
Women’s Court, the very Part to which she had been assigned. 33
Following her many public statements against the Women’s Court,
Mayor LaGuardia finally called upon Kross to formally propose an
alternative for handling prostitution matters. 34 In 1935, she responded
with a substantial report outlining her recommendations, including
abolition of the Women’s Court. 35 She argued that the problems of sex
workers needed to be handled using the wisdom of the new “scientific
age” and that a “medical-social” approach to prostitution was superior to
a criminal approach. 36 Thus she urged creation of a more informal
“sociological court” tribunal outside of the criminal court system staffed
by a physician, psychiatrist, and lawyer where “[e]ach individual will be
considered as a whole person” so that a meaningful plan of rehabilitation
could be developed and effectuated. 37
Although Mayor LaGuardia did not adopt Kross’s call to dismantle
the Women’s Court, he did heed some of her concerns. 38 Thus, Kross
was permitted to undertake various projects within the Magistrates’
Court system that focused on social science-based interventions over
strict adherence to criminal law and procedures. 39 The first such
experiment was Kross’s Magistrates’ Court Social Services Bureau. 40

32. Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York:
Suggested Improvements, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 432 (1938) (“The only way to improve the courts
is to adapt their organization and procedure to the social needs of the times.”).
33. Mrs. Kross Scores Vice Case Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1934, at 24; Whitman, supra
note 18, at 49.
34. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 686-87; see also Denis Tilden Lynch, Woman in State
Supreme Court: Advocates Point to Mrs. Kross, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 1938.
35. Anna Moscowitz Kross, Report on Prostitution and the Women’s Court (1935)
(unpublished report) (on file with author); see also Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 686-87; Mrs.
Kross Favors Social War on Vice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1935, at 2.
36. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 687-88; see also Lynch, supra note 34.
37. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 687-88; Kross, supra note 35; Mrs. Kross Favors
Social War on Vice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1935, at 2; Zelda Popkin, Sociological Court Urged for
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1934, at SS2.
38. Thus began a rocky working relationship between LaGuardia and Kross, which
deteriorated over time. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 688-91; see also CHARLES GARRETT,
THE LAGUARDIA YEARS, MACHINE AND REFORM POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY 161 (1961)
(recounting Kross’s criticism of LaGuardia’s crack down on alleged gamblers and sometimes
“lawless law enforcement” used in gambling raids); Anna Moscowitz Kross, Paper by Magistrate
Kross Presented to the Regional Conference on Social Hygiene 6 (Feb. 5, 1941) (on file with
author).
39. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690;
40. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690; A.Y. Yeghenian, Synopsis of History and
Progress, Magistrates’ Court Social Service Bureau, 1935 to date, (Oct. 1. 1940) (describing the
group’s work from its creation in 1935).
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The Bureau was largely a volunteer group developed in 1935 as an
adjunct to the formal Probation Department to provide social services
and other assistance to Magistrates’ Court defendants even before they
were found guilty or sentenced by the court. 41
In 1936 Kross went on to create the Wayward Minors’ Part for
girls, which dealt with the cases of young women who ordinarily would
have been processed in the adult Women’s Court Part. 42 A sort of
alternative to the alternative court, the Wayward Minors’ Part relaxed
legal standards to use a carrot and stick approach towards rehabilitation
in an attempt to reform young women seen as “sex delinquents.” 43
In the Wayward Minor’s Part, young women were warned they
would be formally prosecuted and face the possibility of a criminal
record and jail time if they did not agree to participate in a rehabilitative
program developed with the assistance of the Social Services Bureau and
Probation Department. 44 The plans of rehabilitation sometimes included
placement outside of the home in hospitals or reformatories; defendants
were required to return to court for status hearings so the judge could
personally monitor progress. 45
Prior to the status hearings, Kross conferred with the court’s
probation officers and social workers to determine how the young
women were doing with treatment. 46 Defendants who were viewed as
successful in their rehabilitative efforts were rewarded with no formal
finding of guilt and often dismissal of the charges. 47 Those who did not
comply or appeared to have “no prospect of an adjustment pursuant to
the plans suggested” could be brought to trial, adjudicated a wayward
Kross
minor, and immediately sentenced to an institution. 48
41. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690, n.145; Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 45054 (“Its purpose is to do something about the tens of thousands of cases which present, not criminal,
but social problems. In appropriate cases it supplements, in a scientific manner, the kindly advice of
well-meaning judges who must form their conclusions as to underlying social difficulties from the
hurried presentation of strictly legal evidence in the courtroom.”); Anna M. Kross, Hypocrisy
Scored in Penal Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1937, at 5 (describing the actions taken by the
Social Services Bureau for defendants before any formal adjudication is entered); see also Quinn,
Lady Vols, supra note 11.
42. Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at 690; see also ANNA M. KROSS, U.S. WORKS PROGRESS
ADMIN., PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH WAYWARD MINORS IN NEW YORK CITY 23-26 (1936).
43. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 441.
44. Id.
45. KROSS, supra note 42, at 14-15, 30-31.
46. Id.
47. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 439-41.
48. KROSS, supra note 42, at 18. Kross conceded that “[t]he[se] expedients are legal, perhaps,
but only because the defendant, the district attorney and the complaining witnesses consent to
them.” Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 439; Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at 26.
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passionately believed that the innovations of the Wayward Minors’ Part
were a preferred alternative to standard case processing and worthy of
replication. 49
IV. KROSS’S HOME TERM PART: THE NATION’S FIRST CRIMINAL
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT
After a decade of working the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross
expanded her experimentation efforts. 50 In 1946, with the support of
Chief Magistrate Judge Edgar Bromberger, she developed another
specialty venue within the Magistrates’ Court system—the Home Term
Court Part – to handle non-felony domestic violence prosecutions. 51
Rather than simply focus on the conviction and sentence of alleged
abusers, Kross sought to use the social-scientific, interventionist
approach in misdemeanor and other non-felony family violence matters
before the Home Term to determine the root cause of the family discord
and help resolve it. 52 In announcing the opening of Kross’s new
experimental court to the press, Chief Magistrate Bromberger explained:
The aim of the new court[] . . . is to attempt to settle without legal
“formalism,” which . . . aggravates such matters, fundamental family
difficulties that comprise more than 10,000 of the cases now handled
annually by the Magistrates’ Courts.
‘It has long been apparent to the magistrates . . . that a mere narrow,

49. Kross, supra note 41, at 5 (describing the success of the Wayward Minors’ Court in
recognizing that the defendants before it were “girls with problems and not problem girls”); Kross
& Grossman, supra note 32, at 430 (portraying Kross’s establishment of the specialized Wayward
Minors’ Part as a positive development because the court “seek[s] scientific differentiation of
treatment for the persons who appear therein, on a sound crime prevention theory”); John M.
Murtaugh, Functions of the Magistrates’ Courts, BAR BULL., March 1953, at 176 (on file with N.Y
City Hall Library) (“The Girls’ Term . . . [b]y an individualized approach to their problems, it seeks
to keep these young women away from the prostitutes with whom they formerly had contact in
Women’s Court. The basic philosophy of the court is that it is more important to adjust than to
adjudicate . . . Its progressive objectives and accomplishments are measured in terms of adjustment
and self-esteem for many girls and their families.”).
50. Kross, supra note 41, at 5; Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 430.
51. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1946, at 23 (announcing that
Chief Magistrate Bromberger and Kross worked together on developing the Home Term Court);
New Marital Court Has Home Setting, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1946, at 23 (Kross’s appointment to
the Home Term by Bromberger).
52. New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23 (“The court will seek to discover fundamental
causes for the difference between the couple and attempt to apply a solution that will preserve the
home and assure a proper atmosphere for the children.”); Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at
26 (describing Kross’s innovation in using social work and psychiatric services in conjunction with
her court parts, including the Home Term).
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legal adjudication of the immediate marital episode causing an arrest
or the issuance of a summons in the Magistrates Courts actually settles
nothing of the fundamental family difficulty. On the contrary, a
hearing or trial in open court, with the couple testifying against each
other – many times in the presence of neighbors – actually provides
additional hazard to future family tranquility and adds a further
disturbing factor to the already muddled family condition.’ 53

Thus, the goal of Kross’s Home Term Part was to try to help
domestic partners address problems with practical, workable solutions,
with the understanding that most couples wanted to try to stay
together. 54 When children were in the home, the goal of intervention
and reconciliation became even more central to the court’s work. 55
Kross and Bromberger had concluded that the prior practice of
merely “[p]unishing the offenders was no solution; the same ones
popped up on the calendar again and again.” 56 For them it appeared
there was often “more than met the eye and mind in the constant
repetition of tales of drunkenness, mistreatment and violence” that made
their way to the Magistrates’ Court. 57 Indeed, with the volume of such
cases rising as World War II drew to an end, 58 Kross and others believed
that otherwise loving partners might be faltering under the strain of
returning home to face economic hardship, housing problems, or other
difficulties. 59 In addition, many couples who had wed in haste before
the war had not spent much time talking about the logistics and

53. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23.
54. RICHARD MAISEL & JUNE CHRIST, FAMILIES IN CONFLICT 17-18 (New York University
Research Center for Human Relations 1954) (published as “an exploratory study of the progress and
the needs of the Home Term Court and the Home Advisory Council”).
55. New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23; see also MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8
(“When children are not involved the judge will not press too hard for social services and the case
may well end in an agreement to separate. If there are children, the pressure is strong to keep the
marriage together.”).
56. Willella De Campi & May Okon, Home Term Court Makes a Home, DAILY NEWS, July 9,
1950, at 5.
57. Id.
58. See New Marital Court, supra note 51, at 23 (describing “post-war tension difficulties”
that seemed to affect some couples who would be seen by the Home Term Court); De Campi &
Okon, supra note 56, at 5 (“The idea for this experimental domestic relations court grew out of the
appalling upsurge of disrupted-family cases that began overcrowding the regular court calendars
during the war.”); see also Flaws in System of Home Life Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1944, at 10
(reporting on a forum held to consider “[w]artime strains on American family life”).
59. Editorial, Topics of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1946, at 24 (“[O]ne current reason for
the dissolution of families is the inability to find housing . . . it is easy to understand how the strain
of living in inadequate quarters, or in the makeshift home with relatives of the wife or husband
would generate unhappiness.”).
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practicalities of cohabitating. 60 To Kross, the philosophy of attempting
to offer help to relationships and families that might otherwise be
salvageable was developed in light of the concerns of the day and as a
considered approach to a particular problem in certain domestic abuse
cases. 61
In order to facilitate treatment and conciliation, Home Term
proceedings were conducted not inside an impersonal courtroom but
within a comfortable complex at 300 Mulberry Street in Manhattan. 62
Modeled to look like a modest apartment maintained by a family with an
income of $4,000 a year, 63 the complex included a living room, dining
room, kitchen and children’s nursery decorated with donations from
various businesses and organizations. 64 According to Kross, one of the
most important furnishings in the complex was a “cheery” red love seat
positioned in the court’s reception room where couples were often asked
to sit and talk. 65 She explained the couch “is symbolic of our great aim.
Two people must sit close together on it. This is exactly what we are
trying to do – to bring together those broken apart.” 66
Despite the seemingly casual approach to domestic abuse cases,
Kross took the work of Home Term very seriously and believed the

60. Kross, supra note 1 (describing “[a] hasty marriage followed by an almost immediate
separation” as a contributing factor in many cases where an “ex-GI” is charged with drunkenness,
disorderly conduct, assault or other misconduct in the home).
61. Id.; see also Charles F. Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Saving the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1952, at SM6. Thus, contrary to claims of many modern court reformers and domestic violence
victims’ advocates, family violence had been prosecuted and handled as a criminal matter at least to
some degree prior to the 1940’s, and the change to a different model in New York City was not a
function of indifference. See, e.g., Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 5 (“The 1990’s witnessed a
sea of change in the criminal justice response to domestic violence. For centuries, domestic
violence had been perceived as a private affair – a personal matter between disputants. Courts did
not handle domestic violence cases in large part because domestic or family violence was not
illegal.”); Thompson, supra note 2, at 417 (suggesting the private nature of family violence resulted
in it being ignored by the criminal justice system until the 1970s and 1980s).
62. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23; DORRIS CLARKE & ALICE W.
FIELD, HOME TERM: A SOCIALIZED COURT FOR FAMILY PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK CITY
MAGISTRATES’ COURT SYSTEM 26 (1948).
63. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 4; CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62.
64. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 4. Even the Metropolitan Museum of Art placed
paintings on loan with the Court to add to the comfortable surroundings for litigants. Id. So
impressive was the décor that Better Homes and Gardens apparently ran a story on the Home Term
Court entitled, “Are Nice Things Necessary,” focusing on Kross’s decision to use “attractive
surroundings” in the court complex to encourage good feelings and good conduct. William C. Nau,
Reviews of Professional Periodicals, 15 FED. PROBATION 49, 52 (1951).
65. Kross, supra note 1.
66. Id.
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court – the first in New York and likely the entire country 67 —could play
an important role in improving society.68 Not only was it developed as a
place to resolve disputes, but as a cutting-edge social science
“laboratory” to study and treat family and individual problems. 69 She
hoped to share results with others 70 and replicate the Home Term project
throughout the city and beyond. 71 Indeed, after two years in operation,
the Home Term produced and disseminated a brochure – HOME TERM:
A SOCIALIZED COURT FOR FAMILY PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK CITY
MAGISTRATES’ COURT SYSTEM—to describe the court’s day-to-day
operations, share its developing expertise, and provide a blueprint for
other jurisdictions considering such a model. 72
As with the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross developed a private
organization to assist with the work of the Home Term Court. This
group, dubbed the Home Advisory Council, consisted of representatives
from religious and benevolent organizations like the Jewish Family
Service, Catholic Charities, and the Lutheran Welfare Council, as well
as lay volunteers. 73 Although an independent non-profit organization,

67. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 3 (1948) (“At its inception Home Term was an
experimental project, no similar court being in existence so far as was known.”). Although
“specialized” courts had been developed in other parts of the country to deal with criminal cases
growing out of family matters, they appeared to focus on failure to support and neglect by parents
rather than domestic violence allegations. See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS 153 (2002).
68. Gertrude Samuels, Court of First Resort for the Family, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 6, 1952, SM20,
SM41 (“To Judge Kross, the Home Term is but the pre-cursor of a still grander design,” including
the modernization of courts and their reliance on the science of human relationships rather than law
alone).
69. Memorandum from Anna M. Kross to Foundation, Experiment in the Home Term Court 2
(1949) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum to Foundation] (seeking financial support for
Home Term Court from foundations and referring to Home Term as a “laboratory for further study
in the solution of family problems”).
70. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 8 (describing Home Term as a “research center” for
“extensive study of families and their problems” where “socio-legal” testing can take place and
“new procedures and techniques may be tried and new facilities promoted”); Memorandum to
Foundation, supra note 69, at 2 (“One of the objectives of the Home Term Court is to serve as a
model which could be implemented in any part of the United States.”).
71. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23 (announcing that Home Term
Courts eventually would be set up in all New York City boroughs but Richmond); see also Quinn,
Lady Vols, supra note 11.
72. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 1 (Edgar Bromberger writes in his foreword: “Home
Term is visited almost daily by professional social workers, sociologists, educators, psychiatrists,
students, legislators and Judges from all parts of the United States and foreign countries interested
in the various phases of the Court’s activities.”).
73. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54; CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 23; see also
Memorandum, An Appeal in Behalf of the Home Term Advisory Council of New York – The
Voluntary Auxiliary of the Family Offenses Part of the Family Court of New York City (unpublished
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the Home Advisory Council was considered an “adjunct” of Home
Term, maintained office space there, and had a dual role – both to
develop cooperation between the court and private social services and to
provide direct case work services to those who came to the court. 74 In
its case work function the group advanced the court’s goal of providing
assistance to families in conflict rather than employing a merely punitive
approach in domestic abuse cases. 75
A case generally made its way to Home Term when one domestic
partner alleged assault, harassment, disorderly conduct or other nonfelony wrongdoing on the part of another domestic partner. 76 Most
charges were brought by wives against husbands. 77 However, a number
of complaints involved non-married couples and disputes among other
family members. 78
Although some matters were initiated by a
defendant’s arrest, the majority began by way of summons following
complaint. 79 The arrest numbers were low, in part, because police
usually restricted such intervention to instances where “the individual’s
presence [was] a serious hazard to the family and his immediate removal
from the home [was] necessary.” 80 Instead, upon responding to
investigate family disputes, officers referred complainants to Home
Term Court to initiate proceedings there. 81
Once a complaint reached Home Term, the relevant parties were
summoned to court and the case was assigned to a representative of the
Court’s probation department for a lengthy intake interview. 82 Both

and undated memo among Kross’s papers at the American Jewish Archives, on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum Appeal].
74. CLARKE & FIELD supra note 62, at 23; see also MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 1.
75. Memorandum of Anna M. Kross, The Origin and History of the Home Advisory and
Service Council of New York, Inc. (on file with American Jewish Archives) [hereinafter
Memorandum on Origin]; see also Home Court Aided By Social Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
1946, at 27 (“advisory council representing all faiths is set up to work out domestic problems”);
New Court to Run on $50,000 Budget, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1946, at 18 (describing the limited
finances of Home Term and its reliance on volunteers to help in family rehabilitative efforts).
76. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 11. Nearly 90% of the cases involved allegations of
third-degree assault, a misdemeanor, or disorderly conduct, an offense considered less serious than a
misdemeanor. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 19.
77. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 9 (“The majority of families appearing at Home Term
present problems between husbands and wives but a large number of cases also result from
difficulties between parents and children over 16 years of age.”).
78. Id. at 9 (noting that siblings, divorced couples, and those in “common-law relationship[s]”
also received assistance from the court).
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 16
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parties were questioned by an intake officer to learn as much as possible
about the specific allegation as well as the circumstances of the parties. 83
The intake officer’s “function [was] to analyze the problem and offer
guidance, as well as to interpret the Court’s procedures and services in
light of the family situation.” 84
In discussing the “problem and possible methods of solution”
available through Home Term, 85 the intake officer seldom recommended
trial and formal adjudication. Rather, the parties – both defendant and
complainant—were usually asked to participate in voluntary pre-trial
rehabilitative “adjustment” services for an indefinite period of time
before any formal adjudication would be made. 86 Because the court did
not have the power to issue formal orders of protection, 87 it sometimes
also recommended a voluntary “cooling off” period of separation. 88 If
the parties agreed to these various arrangements, no appearance before
the judge was necessary. Rather, Judge Kross merely signed off on the
necessary referral paperwork after consulting with the intake officer and
served as an “authoritarian” figure available in the background to ensure
compliance with the plan. 89
Even in cases where the parties requested an immediate hearing,

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 9.
86. Id. at 10 (describing the possible case paths and social services available through the
court).
87. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 11 (explaining that Family Court and not the
Magistrates’ Court had the power to issue orders of protection and that Home Term was without
authority to order defendants out of the family home); see also WALTER GELLHORN, JACOB D.
HYMAN & SIDNEY H. ASCH, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 235
(Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 1954).
It is an ironical fact that the Home Term Court, which is concerned primarily with cases
of family violence is unable, after proven violence in a criminal-type action, to grant an
Order of Protection to an assaulted family, but the Family Court, which is concerned
primarily with non-support and is non-criminal in nature, can give such paper protection.
Id. (quoting a legal aid lawyer).
88. GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 237-38 (explaining that “restor[ing] the
integrity of the home” was the preferred resolution in family violence cases); CLARKE & FIELD,
supra note 62, at 6 (“Although the philosophy of Home Term is based on a presumption in favor of
keeping the family united and intact, when study shows this not to be in the best interest of the
family group, other steps are taken.”); see also Samuels, supra note 68, at 40 (discussing the
“cooling off” periods that were sometimes employed by the court).
89. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 9; see also Samuels, supra note 68, at 20 (Home
Term “aimed to use modern social case-work methods, supported by the authority of the court – but
preferably without resort to formal court action.”). Over time other magistrates also were assigned
to Home Term Court, but Judge Kross continued as the lead judicial officer. GELLHORN, HYMAN &
ASCH, supra note 87, at 220.
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Judge Kross pressed the parties to agree to a period of informal
supervision first. 90 After allowing both sides to address the charges and
air their concerns, Kross generally convinced them it was in their interest
to adjourn the case for purposes of an informal period of supervision
before formal resolution of the charges.
In this way the court used a “carrot and stick” approach to prevent
further discord or violence in the home. 91 Successful adjustment
generally resulted in case closure without formal adjudication of guilt.92
Resistance on the part of the parties or failure to follow through with
informal case work requirements led to a hearing and the possibility of
the defendant’s conviction and incarceration. 93 However, Kross did not
give up easily on families and often worked with them over long periods
of time to effectuate change. 94 Imprisonment was used sparingly as an
intervention of last resort, for instance “when the family require[d]
immediate protection from continued violent and intolerable
abuse. . . .” 95
These processes were considered a “marked departure from legal
formalism” as they offered “a flexible, informal, and socialized
procedure with emphasis on the family’s general welfare rather than

90. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 7-9.
91. See Kross & Grossman, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
92. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 19-20.
93. Id. at 25.
Where the Social Services Unit has been unsuccessful in its efforts at helping the family,
the case is returned to the Court for other action. It may, then, be reassigned to the
Probation Staff or a formal court hearing may be held for the purpose of effecting a final
disposition.
Id.
94. Id. (“When a case is referred to the Social Services Unit by Home Term the Court usually
retains jurisdiction until a satisfactory adjustment of the problem has been made.”); Lawyers Play
2d Fiddle, NEW YORK POST, May 1, 1946, at 8 (“One of the Court’s functions will be to follow up
its cases to see that settlements are complied with. Such a case was that of the drunkard who, after
his wife brought him to court, was referred to Alcoholics Anonymous, reformed, and returned
home, but is still required to report regularly.”).
95. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6. In addition, if the Court believed a complainant
was in danger of future bodily harm, the case was immediately sent to the Court of Special Sessions
for formal prosecution. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 7. In the Court of Special Sessions, a
superior court to the Magistrates’ Court, a defendant had the right to formal presentment of the
charges and jury trial. See Mehl, supra note 10, at 7; see also Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at
306 (describing the work and jurisdiction of New York’s Magistrates’ Courts and comparing it to
the work and jurisdiction of New York’s Court of Special Sessions). Felony-level abuse matters
were also handled outside of Home Term and, in Kross’s view, warranted standard criminal court
treatment. New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 51, at 23 (“The Chief Magistrate
emphasized that the plan is not operative in felony cases ‘or those of a serious nature indicating a
criminal tendency on the part of the defendant,’ which will go to Felony Court as before.”).
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rigid interpretation of the law.” 96 Kross believed it was important to use
the moment of criminal court contact as an opportunity to reach and treat
entire families which might not otherwise seek assistance. 97
Although the kinds of services offered by the court varied
somewhat over time, 98 pre-trial adjustment generally involved some
form of informal case work and marital counseling. 99 Because of the
limited resources of the Court and its probation department, and the
failure of many litigants to follow through with referral appointments, 100
lay volunteer counselors working with the Home Advisory Council often
were the ones to provide direct services to, and supervision of, the
families. 101 While most Home Term litigants were poor, 102 its
volunteers were largely recruited from Kross’s own social circle. 103
Kross sought to tap the resources of “mature women” whose own
children had already left home and whose “native endowment” for
family life would allow them to serve as role models in addition to
counselors. 104 The group ultimately included “wives of physicians,
lawyers, . . . business[men], newspaper and social work executives,” as
well as widows. 105

96. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6.
97. Id. at 6-7; Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 2.
98. See Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that a “child-parent relations
clinic” had been operated by the court for a period of time); CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 6-7.
99. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 23.
100. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 4.
101. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 18; see also Memorandum to Foundation, supra note
69, at 2 (describing the development of the Social Services Unit of the Home Advisory Council);
Memorandum Appeal, supra note 73, at 2-5 (explaining that because of the inadequacy of the
Court’s official probation staff, counseling and supervision needs were augmented by the Home
Advisory Council and its lay volunteers).
102. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 14. Notably, “non-white groups” and Catholics,
generally seen as members of “the city’s lower income strata,” were also disproportionately
represented among the families seen by the court. Id. For instance, although only 9.5% of New
Yorkers in 1954 were African-American, for that same year 50.7% Home Term cases involved
African-American families. Id.
103. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 5 (“It was agreed that there should be no
widespread public appeal for such individuals since there would very likely be a response from the
most undesirable type – those who delight in the chance of telling others what to do.”).
104. Id. The court in several respects attempted to provide models for families to emulate. In
particular, the court was focused on helping women become better wives and mothers and set the
right tone in the home. One article explained that the spotless and organized Home Term quarters
and nursery were intended to inspire the wives to keep their own homes similarly. Samuels, supra
note 68, at 40 (“By indirection, the court is inviting them to copy.”).
105. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 7; see also Family: 4 Upstate Counties to Get
Volunteer Counselors Under Ford Grant, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 1968 (“Since 1946 the
Home Advisory Council has recruited women with college background and family life experience
as volunteers to help New York City courts with family counseling and referral services. The
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The counselors met with their clients for sessions at the court
complex and sometimes conducted further investigations. 106 Visiting
the parties at their home, interviewing other family members, and even
gathering information from teachers of the parties’ children were well
within the scope of the actions taken by the lay counselors and official
probation officers alike. 107 The counselors maintained records of their
work with the family. The court was kept abreast of problems that arose
and remained ready to immediately intervene to address them. 108
Beyond ordinary case work and counseling services, some Court
clients were referred to Home Term’s in-house Alcoholism Clinic, also
overseen by the Home Advisory Council, to receive “medical and
psychological treatment.” 109 Yet others might be sent to the Home Term
Psychiatric Unit after intake for study and a more “satisfactory
understanding of [their] problems.” 110 The Psychiatric Unit was run by
a psychiatrist “on loan” from Bellevue Hospital. 111 In a good many
cases, involuntary hospital commitment followed such referrals, which
Kross believed demonstrated the effectiveness of the Unit. 112
As noted, deferral of prosecution for monitoring and services
required the agreement of both the defendant and the complainant. The
Court’s efforts did not, however, target the accused alone. Rather, the
Court was concerned with the totality of the circumstances that preceded
the conflict and believed that both family partners usually contributed in

volunteers, most of whose husbands are professional or business executives, are given a year’s
training by professional social workers before they are assigned actual cases.”).
106. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 16.
107. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 7-25. The HOME TERM pamphlet offered a sample
letter to other court planners which informed school officials that a child’s parents had sought court
assistance because of familial difficulties and requested the student’s behavioral, “scholastic,
attendance, and mental testing records” to help the court better understand the family’s problems.
Id. at 8. The letter did ask, however, that the school consider the letter a “confidential inquiry.” Id.
108. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 9 ; see also Samuels, supra note at 68, at 20.
109. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 12-13; see also Alcoholics’ Clinic for Court Formed,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1952, at FB64 (announcing the addition of an on-site alcohol abuse clinic to
the list of services offered by Home Term).
110. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 19, 22-23.
111. Id. at 17, 22.
112. Id. at 22.
The effectiveness of the Court’s medical screening is shown by a study of the cases
committed to Bellevue following medical examination by the Court Psychiatrist. This
reveals a comparatively high rate of placement in state mental hospitals from Bellevue of
cases which might not have been detected at the Court level without psychiatric
screening.
Id.
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some way to the marital breakdown. 113 Thus, in most instances the
alleged victim also was asked to participate in programming. In this
way, from intake onward, the court sought “to show each partner his
share in the problem” and take steps to resolve it to keep the family
together. 114
One news story provided an example of a wife who might be seen
as contributing to discord and violence in the home by the Home Term
Court:
Often husbands and wives are totally unaware of the reasons for their
difficulties. A man may come home drunk and beat his wife, and to
the untrained observer he may be completely at fault, the wife
guiltless. But the skilled investigator sometimes finds there is a subtle
antagonism of long standing that leads to violence. 115

A study of the Court described another situation where the wife was
seen as part of the problem as it related to abuse at the hands of a
husband who used alcohol to excess:
The themes of conflict vary. . . . Outstanding among them is the
husband’s addiction to drink. The Court, however, has learned to
regard some forms of drinking as the symptom rather than the cause of
the family conflict. Take a typical case: the husband is a steady
worker and a week-end drinker. Indeed, he often offers his steady
work history of proof that he is not an alcoholic. In explaining his
weekend bouts he describes his wife as a poor housekeeper and a
woman from whom he gets little warmth, if any, and much nagging.
He gives the impression that there is no common interest between them
and no sexual attraction left. Often this type of drinking begins just
after a child is born. Apparently the wife then withdraws from the
husband. Since she does not go out with him, he goes by himself and
drinks to pass the time. The assault occurs as a rule when he returns,
116
drunk, and she starts nagging.

In such cases, Home Term’s intake officer might begin familial
intervention by instructing the “wife not to berate her husband while he

113. Id. at 6 (“Home Term consider[ed] the offense in relation to the total personalities and
situations of the individuals, as well as the physical, medical and social needs of their family
groups.”).
114. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 10. Indeed, reviewers of Home Term offered their
opinion that for its litigants “unconscious motivation must have worked in favor of selecting
complementary neuroses in partners.” Id. at 23.
115. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 5.
116. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 22.
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is drunk.” 117 And while the husband might be referred to the Court’s
Alcoholism Clinic for substance abuse treatment, the wife would also
receive some kind of “specialized professional help” to address her
alleged issues. 118
This approach both surprised and troubled some complaining
witnesses who had expected Home Term to automatically align with
them against their husbands. 119 Although most complaining witnesses
did not want to end their marriages or jail their spouses, some wanted the
Court to act as a “trump card” to help exert control over a range of
behaviors on the part of husbands. 120 The Court viewed these women as
unduly concerned with vengeance and retribution, and sought to redirect
them towards amelioration and a way of thinking that would purportedly
assist in successful conciliation – the outcome most of the women said
they wanted. 121 On the other hand, defendants were said to be pleased
with the Court’s approach which gave them a voice, held wives
accountable for some problems in the home, and allowed long-standing
conflicts to be aired and addressed behind closed doors with a counselor
rather than in an open courtroom. 122
Beyond this, Kross claimed that Home Term often discovered
that it was “the accuser [who was] the offender, not the accused.” 123 To
demonstrate this phenomenon, she pointed to the case of a mother who
came to court to file a complaint against her eldest son for assault. 124
The mother went on to claim that the rest of her five children had turned
against her as well. 125 At times during the intake interview, the
Probation Officer found the woman incoherent and difficult to follow. 126
The Officer also learned from the eldest son that his mother had had a
nervous breakdown in the past and that after the recent death of his

117. Id. at 10.
118. De Campi & Okon, supra note 56, at 5.
119. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 18 (explaining that many wives were “surprised
when [their] own conduct [was] questioned”).
120. Id. at 17-18.
121. Id.; see also Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 1 (“Treating family cases as
criminal cases had proved to offer no real protection to society and to aggravate the basic family
conflict.” Thus, in Home Term such matters were dealt with “on an ameliorative rather than
punitive basis.”); Kross, supra note 1, at 3 (“Here we are not entirely interested in guilt or
punishment. We want to find out what is causing the break in a family and what will hold the group
together.”).
122. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 17.
123. Kross, supra note 1, at 3.
124. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19; see also Mehl, supra note 10, at 8-9.
125. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19.
126. Id.
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father the family unit had devolved further. 127 Working only part time,
the mother needed to rely on her adult children to help pay rent and
support the younger siblings, which often caused friction. 128 The intake
interviewer referred the son and mother to the Court Psychiatrist for
assessment. 129 The Psychiatrist then met with the intake interviewer and
Judge Kross, who all agreed the mother should be committed to
Bellevue Hospital for further study. 130 Although the siblings initially
were resistant to the idea, the Court and its staff helped convince them to
file a complaint against the mother. 131 With this, the summons against
the son was dismissed and the mother was institutionalized. 132
Remarkably, nearly all of Home Term’s work took place without
the involvement of attorneys. Most of the individuals before the court
were unable to afford private counsel. 133 As the Court was established
before Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger v. Hamlin, defendants did
not have a constitutional right to counsel. 134 Although free counsel was
provided for some non-felony prosecutions by the Legal Aid Society and
other groups in New York City, 135 Home Term generally convinced its

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 17-19.
131. Id.
132. Id. This was not the only case where a mother was institutionalized after seeking
assistance from the court in dealing with her children. In at least one other instance a mother asked
the court for help because her son was not attending school, running away from home, and striking
her. Kross, supra note 1, at 3-4. Kross explained:
Instead of the son being sent to an institution, we at last persuaded the mother to go to a
psychiatric hospital for examination and treatment. This case presents the whole crux of
our problem. So often the people who come before us need to be examined for nerves
and general health. Many definitely require psychiatric treatment.
Id.
133. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8 (“[M]ost of the Court’s clientele are financially not
in a position to avail themselves of personal legal advice.”).
134. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Historically, however, New York provided a greater right to counsel for defendants than required
under federal law. See Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of
Defendants’ Rights: The Case of New York 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157, 178 (1978-79).
Indeed, indigent persons accused of misdemeanors in New York were entitled to free counsel as of
1965. See People v. Witenski, 207 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1965); see also N.Y. County Law § 722,
Article 18-B (McKinney 1965).
135. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 429, 433 (describing the lack of adequate
representation for indigent persons charged with crimes in the Magistrates’ Court); see also LEE
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 123-135
(1965) (noting the problem across the United States of lack of appointed counsel for persons
charged with misdemeanors and minor offenses); HARRISON TWEED, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
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litigants that traditional legal representation was not necessary. 136 When
lawyers did appear in court, the Judge and Home Term’s staff usually
persuaded them to waive clients’ rights for purposes of informal
adjustment, suggesting they play a helpful role in resolving the parties’
differences. 137 With this non-adversarial, problem-solving orientation,
Home Term established a “new conception of the lawyer’s function.” 138
Although Judge Kross’s Home Term had many supporters, 139 it
also drew a great deal of criticism over the years. 140 Some disapproval
came from within the ranks of the judiciary, which found Home Term’s
courtroom operations—including its informality and rejection of judicial
robes and benches—to be distasteful and disrespectful of standards
employed for decades in courts across the country. 141
Other commentators, like legal scholar and sociologist Paul
Tappan, found the idea of using the authority of criminal courts to
attempt to address “social” issues highly problematic. 142 For instance,
although seductive in its alleged novelty and concern for litigant wellbeing, the “treatment without trial” approach opened the door to judges
exercising a great deal of control over litigants’ lives and imposing
personal morality and conduct standards. 143 Without any check on
NEW YORK CITY: 1876-1951 82-100 (1954) (chronicling the provision of legal representation for
the indigents in criminal cases in New York City).
136. See Lawyers Play 2d Fiddle, supra note 94, at 8; MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8
(“The judges at Home Term tend to use lawyers mainly for clarifying the goals and hopes of their
clients; that is, as additional resources for helping to mend family conflict rather than as
representatives of one side in the conflict.”)
137. Lawyers Play 2d Fiddle, supra note 94, at 8 (“In several cases, the lawyers brought along
by complainants and defendants were asked to step aside to allow the court’s social workers to have
first try at ironing out the disagreements.”); CLARKE & FIELD, supra note 62, at 20 (explaining that
consent is obtained from counsel prior to the intake interview and that “except in special instances
[attorneys] are not present when their clients are interviewed by the Probation Staff”); Samuels,
supra note 68, at 20 (“The lawyers, who asked to see the judge in advance of their clients, are
agreed that both need psychiatric help.”).
138. MAISEL & CHRIST, supra note 54, at 8.
139. See, e.g., Salute to Judge Kross, supra note 12, at 12 (recounting that the Home Term Part
was “recently lauded by the State Probation Commission as a model which should be applied
throughout the state”). Murtaugh, supra note 49, at 175 (a variety of complementary statements
about Home Term by John Murtaugh, the Chief Magistrate Judge who replaced Judge Bromberger).
140. Samuels, supra note 68, at 41 (“Not all who have watched Home Term grow approve the
idea.”).
141. Id. at 41 (“Some judges object to the ‘untidy’ appearance of the court.”).
142. See Paul W. Tappan, Treatment Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306 (1945-1946)
[hereinafter Tappan, Treatment]; PAUL W. TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT 175-209 (1947);
CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 10-13 (Paul Tappan, ed. 1951); see also COMMUNITY SERVICE
SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, A NEW PATTERN FOR FAMILY JUSTICE (1954); GELLHORN, HYMAN &
ASCH, supra note 87.
143. Tappan, Treatment, supra note 142, at 309.
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Home Term’s discretion or its informal procedures, “individuals
innocent of any serious wrongdoing or real law violation” could be
“subject to the rather crude tools of correctional treatment” used by the
court. 144 Tappan worried about the increased focus on “mental
pathology” and labeling of so many alleged offenders as sick and in need
of treatment and cure. 145
Other social service agencies and experts warned there was
“[s]trong doubt . . . that the Magistrates’ Courts constitute[d] the
appropriate judicial setting for expansion into what is essentially a noncriminal field of dealing with the maladjustments of youths and
families.” 146 For them, Home Term appeared to suffer from a
“confusion of purpose, jurisdiction and procedure” that often
confounded litigants, duplicated civil court efforts, and used scarce
resources inefficiently. 147
Because of concerns about waste and disorganization in New
York courts, attorney Harrison Tweed was appointed by Governor
Dewey to head up a commission to review court operations and make
suggestions for improvement. 148 Looking at issues of cost, delay,
duplication of services, and problems of procedure and practice, Tweed
initially called for sweeping change within the courts. 149 Although there
was resistance to some of Tweed’s initial proposals resulting in final
recommendations that were less comprehensive, 150 others continued to
press for significant changes to New York’s family court system. 151
Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia Law School became one
of the champions of this cause. In 1954 he published a book-length
study of the various courts in New York City, in which he lauded

144. Id.; COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142, at 16-17.
145. CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION, supra note 142, at 10-13.
146. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142.
147. Id. at 18, 40.
148. See Barry Mahoney, The Administration of Justice and Court Reform, 31 PROC. OF THE
ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 58, 59 (1974); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Book Review of New York Civil
Practice by Jack B. Weinstein, Harold L. Korn and Arthur R. Miller, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1306
(1965).
[T]he Temporary Commission on the Courts under the chairmanship of Harrison Tweed
. . . , the product of the then generally rising anxiety over the efficacy of the judicial
establishment, was supposed to look at the administration of justice in New York and to
make recommendations for its improvement.
Id.
149. Mahoney, supra note 148, at 59-60; Hazard, supra note 148, at 1306-07.
150. Mahoney, supra note 148, at 59-60; Hazard, supra note 148, at 1306-07.
151. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, supra note 142, at 38-39; see also
GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 217-38.
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Kross’s “indefatigable zeal” and “skill at improvisation,” which had
resulted in the establishment and continuation of Home Term within the
criminal court system for nearly a decade. 152 Despite his admiration for
her work, however, on behalf of the Bar of the City of New York he
called for amendment to New York’s constitution to permit state court
reorganization generally and unification of all domestic relations related
courts more specifically – including Home Term. 153
Interestingly, as Gellhorn was about to complete his study, Kross
was appointed to serve as Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Corrections. 154 Thus she left her post as Magistrates’
Court judge. Nevertheless, having always believed that the family
conflicts addressed by Home Term should have been handled outside of
standard criminal prosecution processes, 155 Kross was generally
supportive of Gellhorn’s proposals. 156 In 1961, constitutional and
statutory amendments resulted in restructuring of New York state’s court
system. 157 This included merger of the City’s Magistrate Court system
with the Court of Special Sessions to form a new city-wide court with

152. GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH, supra note 87, at 234.
153. Id. at 238.
154. See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at n.161 and accompanying text. Indeed, in his study
Gellhorn noted Kross’s departure from the bench during this period. GELLHORN, HYMAN & ASCH,
supra note 87, at 220 n.*.
155. Memorandum on Origin, supra note 75, at 1 (“Treating family cases as criminal cases had
proved to offer no real protection to society and to aggravate the basic family conflict.”); Topics of
the Times, supra note 59, at 24 (describing Home Term as a pre-divorce court); De Campi & Okon,
supra note 56, at 5 (noting that Judge Kross brought to Home Term “a strong humanitarian sense
and a conviction that family difficulties should be dealt with from a social instead of a criminal
viewpoint”).
156. Kross & Grossman, supra note 32, at 421-422 (1938); see also Magistrate Urges Family
Law Study: Mrs. Kross Calls on Women’s Bar Groups to Seek New Procedures for Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1952, at 45 (Kross recommended “formation of a joint committee of the women’s
bar associations of the city to make a more intensive study of family problems in the courts of
different jurisdictions, to develop new procedures aimed at solution of the problems.”). In a letter to
Rev. Robert W. Searle, Kross’s confidante and Executive Director of the Home Advisory Council,
she expressed her approval of Gellhorn’s study and proposals for court reform. See Letter from Dr.
Robert Searle to Anna M. Kross (Aug. 8, 1953) (on file with author); see Letter from Anna M.
Kross to Dr. Robert Searle (Aug. 12, 1953) (on file with author).
157. AARON D. SAMUELS, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT LAW AND PRACTICE 6-11 (1964).
In 1962, as one of the measures submitted under the substantially amended and revised
judiciary article of the State Constitution, the new Family Court Act was proposed by the
Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, . . . The new statewide Family
Court was based on the judicial article of the State Constitution (Article VI), as that
article had been extensively revised and amended in adoption by the People in 1961.
Id.
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jurisdiction over non-felony criminal offenses. 158 An expanded statewide family court system also was established. 159 Thus, in 1962 Kross’s
Home Term Part was abolished and non-felony domestic violence
matters were reassigned to the reformulated family court system and its
new Civil Family Offenses Part. 160
V. LOOKING BACK AT HOME TERM AS WE LOOK AHEAD: THE FUTURE
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS
In many significant ways, Kross’s Home Term—a specialized
criminal court part that handled domestic violence prosecutions in a
differentiated and particularized manner with a view towards preventing
further violence—presents remarkable similarities to today’s criminal
domestic violence courts. Its establishment of a “dedicated court team”
including judges, specially trained social services staff, and lawyers
presents striking parallels to modern specialized domestic violence court
practices. 161
158. See Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3, at n.166 and accompanying text; see generally Robert
E. Allard & Fred Breen, Court Reorganization Reform – 1962, 46 JUDICATURE 110, 113 (1962).
159. SAMUELS, supra note 157, at 7-10 (“[T]he courts which [the Family Court] immediately
succeeded, the powers, case load and, for the most part, the personnel of which were transferred to it
to establish the new court on September 1, 1962, . . . These include the Children’s Courts, Domestic
Relations Court of the City of New York, Girls’ Term Court of the City of New York, Home Term
Court of the Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York, Court of Special Sessions of the City of
New York (paternity cases), Surrogates and County Courts (adoptions).”).
159. Id. at 7-10.
160. Id. at 41-42. Under the new Family Court Act:
A new concept of ‘family offenses,’ including assaults and disorderly conduct suffered
by wives and others at the hands of members of their own families (Family Court Act,
sec. 811), which will hereafter treat in civil proceeding such offenses formerly requiring
criminal complaint (id.), underlies the vesting in the Family Court of exclusive original
jurisdiction “over any proceedings concerning acts which would constitute disorderly
conduct or an assault between spouses or between parent and child or between members
of the same family or household.” (Id., sec. 812). . . . It is found that most of these
situations require help rather than punishment, and even where they were formerly
cognizable in criminal courts, as in the Home Term of the former New York City
Magistrates’ Courts, psychiatric and alcoholism clinics were the principle resort rather
than criminal punishment. So, it has been determined, civil rather than criminal
procedure is required. . . . Allowance is made for those cases in which what may be
deemed a really criminal situation may appear [and the] court in its discretion, may
transfer any of its proceedings to the appropriate criminal court.
Id. Interestingly, Kross’s Home Advisory Council was kept in place and adopted as an official
feature of the new Family Offenses Part. See An Appeal in Behalf of The Home Advisory Council of
New York – The Volunteer Auxiliary of the Family Offenses Part of the Family Court of New York
City 1 (1963); 4 Upstate Counties Get Volunteer Counselors Under Ford Grant, supra note 105.
161. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 6 (“The first domestic violence court in the state
opened in Brooklyn in 1996, handling felony-level domestic violence cases. The model was
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On the other hand, Home Term’s stated goals of attempting to solve
underlying problems and issues that contributed to discord in
relationships reflects a fundamentally different orientation than the one
seen in contemporary domestic violence courts. As noted, today’s
domestic violence courts focus almost exclusively on victim safety and
defendant accountability. 162 For instance, modern courts may order
defendants to participate in lengthy batterer intervention counseling
programs as part of their standardized approach to intimate violence
prosecutions. 163 However, they are not particularly interested in offering
help to alleged offenders. 164 Indeed, batterer intervention programs are
known to be largely ineffectual as a method of treatment. 165 Attendance

designed to overturn the ‘business as usual’ approach to domestic violence. The court featured a
single presiding judge, a fixed prosecutorial team, and enhanced staffing to monitor defendant
compliance and provide assistance to victims.”).
162. See GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEMSOLVING JUSTICE 158-59 (“The primary objective of most domestic violence courts is enhancement
of victim safety. Other outcome measures include reducing recidivism, improved monitoring and
accountability for defendants, improved case processing efficiency, and better coordination among
all of the players involved in domestic-violence cases.”); see also id. at 160, n.22 (batterers
programs seen as a “sanction” for alleged offenders); Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 7-9
(defining the core principles underlying domestic violence courts as victim services, judicial
monitoring, accountability, and coordinated community response).
163. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5 (describing the 26-week counseling
program required of many defendants in New York); see also BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note
162, at 160, n.22. While practicing as a public defender in New York City, this author had many
clients ordered into such 26-week programs. In addition to causing many of my clients to miss time
from work in order to attend the sessions, the court’s orders often required them to pay for such
services. It appeared to me that these financial burdens often worked to hurt my clients’ partners
and their children in the long run by redirecting resources that would have otherwise been available
to them. In addition, several batterer programs in New York City were found to be problematic in
other ways. Mazur and Aldrich, supra note 4, at 9 (“One batterers intervention program in
Brooklyn, not accustomed to being accountable to the court, reported as a matter of course that all
offenders sentenced to the program were in compliance even if they were not. When the court
realized this, it stopped referring defendants to this program.”); see also Sarah Goodyear, Rehab
Madness, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 13, 2001 (highlighting a case where a counselor for men
convicted of domestic violence shot his domestic partner).
164. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5. Akin to Kross’s approach to such
matters, a more “controversial intervention is couples therapy, which views men and women as
equally responsible for creating disturbances in the relationship.” Id. Currently, however, this
approach “is widely criticized for assigning the victim a share of the blame for the continuation of
violence.” Id.
165. Id. (A New York Study showed that “Batterer intervention programs do not change
batterers’ attitudes and may have only minor effects on behavior; a “Florida study found no
significant differences between those who had treatment and those who did not as to whether they
battered again or their attitudes towards domestic violence.”); see also Berman & Feinblatt, supra
note 162, at 160-161 (acknowledging that there is very little research to suggest that batterer
programs actually change defendant behaviors; court monitoring is likely to have more of an impact
on recidivism).
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at batterers’ programs is simply a means of keeping tabs on defendants
and sanctioning them. 166 This arrangement renders today’s domestic
violence parts outliers in the modern criminal specialty court movement,
which generally encourages rehabilitation and therapeutic outcomes for
defendants. 167 Interestingly then, contemporary domestic violence
venues – purportedly “problem solving courts”—seem less concerned
with trying to solve the problems of their litigants than Kross’s Home
Term Part of six decades ago.
This is not to say that all of Home Term’s methods should be
celebrated or replicated. In aggressively promoting heteronormative,
white, upper-and middle-class family values, as well as traditional
conceptions of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers through
criminal court processes, many of the features of Home Term likely
would be seen as problematic by modern feminists and others. 168

166. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 41.
The primary ‘service’ offered to defendants is batterers programs. But in New York []
batterers programs are used by domestic violence courts primarily as a monitoring tool
rather than a therapeutic device. This approach is based on the research about batterers
programs, which is extremely mixed. It is unclear whether these programs have any
impact at all in deterring further violence.
Id.
167. Mazur & Aldrich, supra note 4, at 41 (“There are substantial differences between
domestic violence courts and other problem-solving courts . . . domestic violence courts are not
targeted at ‘rehabilitating’ defendants. Indeed, services are offered primarily to help victims
achieve independence.”).
168. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 194 (2007)
(recounting critiques of traditional, gendered conceptions of husbands and wives that existed in the
law prior to the 1970’s); Chrys Ingraham, The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and
Theories of Gender, in MATERIALIST FEMINISM 275, 283 (Rosemary Hennessy & Chrys Ingraham
eds., 1997).
[H]eterosexual imaginary is that way of thinking which conceals the operation of
heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any critical analysis of
heterosexuality as an organizing institution . . . . [I]t naturalizes the regulation of
sexuality though the institution of marriage and state domestic-relations laws . . . [and]
these laws and public policies use marriage as the primary requirement for social and
economic benefits rather than distributing resources on some other basis.
Id.; Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical Study of Black Single Mothers and Their
Families, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 171 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., 1991) (“Because racism permeates and transcends all
social relationships, economic and political arrangements such as slavery, segregation, and
desegregation have not operated in the public arena alone, but have seeped into the private arenas of
sexuality, marriage, and family, and the personal lives of Blacks and whites, men and women.”);
Ann Willard, Cultural Scripts for Mothering, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 225 (Carol Gilligan
et al., eds., 1988) (“Conflicting views of what women ‘ought’ to do permeate the media, the child
development literature, and the emerging literature on adult development. These views are
embodied in ‘cultural scripts’ for motherhood, messages from the culture about the ‘right way’ to be
a mother.”).
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Similarly, in many instances Home Term’s inherent and intense focus on
preserving the family unit resulted in unfortunate and unfounded victimblaming and women being encouraged to remain against their wishes in
difficult, if not dangerous, situations. 169 Like many modern problemsolving courts, such as those focused on drug-treatment and mentalhealth issues, Home Term’s relaxed procedural rules, “teamwork”
approach for lawyers, and non-adversarial processes would also raise
serious concerns for the defense bar and civil libertarians. 170
Despite these serious shortcomings, largely a function of the norms
and restrictions of the day, some of Home Term’s practices raise
interesting questions for today’s legal scholars, practitioners, and court
planners, and may serve as a useful point of departure for further
discussion and reflection. Compared to today’s domestic violence courts
with their binary approach to family problems and myopic focus on
intervening to rescue victims and control defendants, Home Term may
suggest a more nuanced understanding and approach to social, personal,
relational, and familial dynamics. 171 For instance, by respecting the
desires of women who wished to stay with their partners or withdraw
criminal charges, it appears Home Term sought to honor and preserve
their personal autonomy. 172 In developing individualized case work

169. See Kristen Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in
Legal Culture, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 95, 97 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., 1991) (“[W]hen the claim that a woman has
been sexually assaulted is made, it is often based upon her blamelessness in contributing to her own
harm . . . [this] claim to innocence is not easily made, for the shadow of guilt lingers (as with the
defendant.”)); Doug A. Timmer & William H. Norman, The Ideology of Victim Precipitation, 9
CRIM. JUST. REV. 63 (1984) (“[V]ictim precipitation explanation functions as an ideology which
blames the victim and diverts attention from the structural causes of crime.”).
170. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor David Wexler’s Warm TJ Invitation:
Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 552 (2007);
Quinn, Revisiting, supra note 3; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 37 (20002001).
171. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 801-820 (2007)
(“Accepting such binary characterizations of abusers and victims dispels the government and
society’s responsibility for creating the conditions precedent to domestic abuse.”); Deborah Sontag,
Fierce Entanglements, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at 11 (“[T]he criminal justice system is a blunt
club for a problem as psychologically dark, emotionally tangled and intimate as domestic violence”
and “the reality is that abused women often make calculated decisions to stay with their partners.”);
see also Mae C. Quinn, Finding Power Fighting Power (or The Perpetual Motion Machine)(work
in progress; on file with author).
172. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 243 (2005)
(mandatory arrest policies and “the decision to sacrifice autonomy” are “based on flawed
conceptions of will and resistance, as well as faulty ideas concerning the curative power of state
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plans rather than standard case resolutions for all matters, the stated
concerns and wishes of those involved were considered and respected in
a way that they are not in many modern family violence courts. 173 And
by taking into account various factors that might help explain improper
conduct on the part of alleged batterers, 174 Home Term avoided a “onesize-fits-all approach” that seems to permeate today’s domestic violence
courts and contemporary attempts to explain violence between
intimates. 175
By recognizing the complexity of human relations and life more
generally, guilt and future dangerousness of all men was not presumed in
Home Term, 176 nor helplessness on the part of women systemically

intervention”); Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons From Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999); Erin Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop
Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003)
(criticizing mandatory arrest and no-drop policies for disrespecting victim choices and autonomy);
see also Radha Iyengar, Op-Ed., The Protection Battered Spouses Don’t Need, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2007, at A19 (Harvard health policy researcher found that in states with mandatory arrest policies,
homicides are about 50% higher than in states without such policies).
173. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 162, at 160, n.22 (noting that nearly 80% of
alleged offenders in domestic violence courts who receive some kind of mandate are required to
participate in a batterer intervention program and that Florida requires participation in such
programs as a matter of law for alleged abusers).
174. Indeed, as soldiers return from serving in the Middle East and are not provided by the
military with sufficient mental health and other services, our courts may be confronting some of the
same difficult issues Kross faced at the end of World War II. See Deborah Sontag & Lizette
Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008.
The New York Times found 121 cases in which veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan
committed a killing in this country, or were charged with one, after their return from
war. In many of those cases, combat trauma and the stress of deployment – along with
alcohol abuse, family discord and other attendant problems – appear to have set the stage
for a tragedy that was part destruction, part self-destruction. . . . About a third of the
victims were spouses, girlfriends or children or other relatives. . . .
Id.; see also Ogden, supra note 6, at 364 (acknowledging that 85% of those believed to be batterers
lived in violent homes as children, with many suffering physical or mental abuse themselves);
JAMES GILLIGAN, REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC: VIOLENCE 191 (1997).
You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental
hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcibly and constantly reminded of the
extreme poverty and discrimination that characterize their lives. . . .Any approach to a
theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country.
Id.
175. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5. (“The models that underlie batterer
intervention programs may need improvement. New approaches based on research into the causes
of battering and batterer profiles may be more productive than a one-size-fits-all approach.”).
176. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 162, at 103 (explaining that in the Brooklyn
Domestic Violence Court “[d]efendants would be required to participate in batterer intervention
programs as a condition of bail”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 3, Art. 3
QUINN_FINAL

762

3/23/2009 3:03 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:733

assumed. 177 By taking a second look at Home Term – what appears to
be the nation’s first criminal domestic violence court – modern court
reformers may learn not only that their innovations are not so new, but
that there are important insights to gain from the past as we attempt to
address domestic violence in the future.

177. See Gruber, supra note 171, at 801-20 (lamenting essentialist assumptions underlying
many modern domestic violence prevention approaches).
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